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Governments of low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) are widely implementing performance-based financing
(PBF) to improve healthcare services. However, it is unclear whether PBF provides good value for money compared
to status quo or other interventions aimed at strengthening the healthcare system in LMICs. The objective of this
systematic review is to identify and synthesize the existing literature that examines whether PBF represents an
efficient manner of investing resources. We considered PBF to be efficient when improved care quality or quantity
was achieved with equal or lower costs, or alternatively, when the same quality of care was achieved using less
financial resources. A manual search of the reference lists of two recent systematic reviews on economic evaluations of
PBF was conducted to identify articles that met our inclusion and exclusion criteria. Subsequently, a search strategy
was developed with the help of a librarian. The following databases and search engines were used: PubMed, EconLit,
Google Scholar and Google. Experts on economic evaluations were consulted for validation of the selected studies. A
total of seven articles from five LMICs were selected for this review. We found the overall strength of the evidence to
be weak. None of the articles were full economic evaluations; they did not make clear connections between the costs
and effects of PBF. Only one study reported using a randomized controlled trial, but issues with the randomization
procedure were reported. Important alternative interventions to strengthen the capacities of the healthcare system
have not been considered. Few studies examined the costs and consequences of PBF in the long term. Important
costs and consequences were omitted from the evaluations. Few LMICs are represented in the literature, despite
wide implementation. Lastly, most articles had at least one author employed by an organization involved in the
implementation of PBF, thereby resulting in potential conflicts of interest. Stronger empirical evidence on
whether PBF represents good value for money in LMICs is needed.
Keywords: Performance-based financing (PBF), Economic evaluation, Efficiency, Low- and middle- income
countries (LMICs), ReviewIntroduction
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the Creative Commons license, and indicate if[1] reports that between 20–40 % of resources spent on
health are being wasted. Inefficiency is caused by in-
appropriate use of medicine and equipment, medical
errors, suboptimal quality of care, costly staff mix, un-
motivated healthcare workers, and corruption [1].
Faced with these issues, program planners must make
difficult decisions about the best ways to invest limited
resources to improve healthcare services and popula-
tion health.
In recent years, many governments, donors, consult-
ancy firms and non-governmental organisationsThis article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
ns.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
e appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
changes were made.
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nisms of healthcare systems in LMICs, namely by
implementing performance-based financing (PBF) to
link payments to results. In this model, healthcare fa-
cilities are paid based on the extent to which pro-
viders meet pre-defined quantity- and quality-related
performance targets, following an independent verifi-
cation [2]. Examples of quantity-related performance
indicators include the number of consultations for
children under the age of five or the number of
births per month. Examples of quality-related per-
formance indicators include the healthcare center’s
cleanliness or completeness of patient registries.
Healthcare centers sometime have to reach a minimal
quality score (e.g., at least 50 %) in order to be eli-
gible for bonuses. Quality scores are also used as an
inflator or deflator of bonus payments.
The implementation of PBF is rapidly expanding.
For example, the World Bank reports that the number
of African countries using PBF increased from four to
21 between 2006 and 2013 [3]. Despite the rapid im-
plementation of PBF, it is unclear whether given the
same amount of resources, PBF can buy more health-
care services or health than the status quo or other
interventions aiming to strengthen the healthcare
system in LMICs. Existing systematic reviews on
economic evaluations of PBF mainly draw their con-
clusions from studies conducted in high-income coun-
tries (HICs) [4, 5]. The results of these systematic
reviews therefore cannot be generalized to LMICs,
seeing that contexts and resources differ significantly.
Distinctive characteristics of LMICs may influence the
relations between the costs of PBF and the outcomes
observed in HICs. For instance, the initial fixed costs
associated with building data infrastructure or moni-
toring systems may require different investments. Ac-
cording to Fritsche et al. [3], PBF programs tend to
require about five percent of additional financing in
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) countries compared to 30–40 % of
additional financing in LMICs. Moreover, factors un-
related to the motivation of health workers or outside
of their control may affect healthcare services to a
greater degree in LMICs compared to HICs. On the
provider side, these factors may be related to the lack
of continuous training, drug supplies, tools and the
availability of other resources. On the service-user
side, these factors can be related to the difficulty of
paying direct and indirect user-fees [6, 7]. Thus, it is
important to evaluate whether PBF represents good
value for money specifically within the context of
LMICs.
The objective of this systematic review is to identify
and synthesize the existing literature that examineswhether PBF represents an efficient manner of investing
resources. In line with Emmert et al.’s approach [4], pay-
for-performance (P4P) was considered efficient when
improved care quality or quantity is achieved with equal
or lower costs, or alternatively, when the same quality or





We conducted a systematic review to identify and
synthesize literature on economic evaluations of PBF in
LMICs. This review is in line with the PRISMA state-
ment [8]. The initial protocol was not registered.
Eligibility criteria
Inclusion criteria In this systematic review, we in-
cluded: 1) studies conducted in LMICs, as define by
the World Bank [9]; 2) studies using experimental or
observational designs to assess the costs (or inputs)
and consequences (or outputs); and 3) studies in
which a comparison between alternatives was made
(including the status quo). We included studies that
were primarily impact evaluations only if they also
presented results on the costs of PBF. Following
Drummond et al.’s [10] categorization scheme, we dif-
ferentiated studies depending on whether costs, conse-
quences, or both were considered. This approach
results in a classification that distinguishes: “Type I”
studies as full economic evaluations that make a clear
connection between the costs and consequences of
two or more alternatives (e.g., cost-effectiveness ana-
lyses, cost-utility analyses or cost-benefit analyses);
“Type II” studies as partial economic evaluations that
describe the costs and consequences of initiatives
without making a clear connection between the two;
“Type III” studies that compare the costs of the initia-
tives without providing an effectiveness analysis re-
garding the health services or health outcomes; and
“Type IV” studies that provide information on the
costs of a PBF initiative without any description of
changes in healthcare services or health outcomes [4].
To avoid overlooking important literature, we in-
cluded articles belonging to these four types of eco-
nomic evaluation studies.
Exclusion criteria In this systematic review, we ex-
cluded: 1) studies conducted in HICs, as defined by
the World Bank [9]; 2) publications that did not
provide empirical evidence, such as editorials and in-
terviews; 3) non-comparative evaluations because full
economic evaluations require the comparison of two
alternatives; 4) studies that only described a PBF
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5) studies that focused only on demand-side finan-
cial incentives, such as financial compensations or
bonuses for people who seek healthcare.
Information sources
Searching in previous systematic review We began
our search by manually screening the reference lists
of two recent systematic reviews to find economic
evaluations of PBF focusing specifically on LMICs. A
well-cited review, conducted by Emmert et al. [4],
covered economic evaluations of PBF published be-
tween January 2000 and April 2010. The authors did
not impose location-related restrictions. Meacock
et al. [5] repeated the same search in September
2012 to ensure that no recent articles were omitted.
We also screened the reference lists of additional
relevant reviews that came to our attention during
the search [11–14]. By reviewing past systematic re-
views, we were able to identify pertinent studies
published between January 2000 and September
2012.
Searching in databases As Rethlefsen et al. [15] rec-
ommend, we collaborated with a professional librarian
from the University of Montreal. We adapted Emmert
et al.’s [4] search strategy to find more recent literature
on economic evaluations of PBF in LMICs. Our search
differed from Emmert et al. [4]'s in that we: 1) added
Mesh terms and descriptors to expand the search; 2)
modified the list of search terms by using more trun-
cated terms (e.g., “cost*” includes “cost-effectiveness”);
3) deleted currency-related terms (e.g., dollars, yen) to
better target pertinent results, given the rapid expan-
sion of PBF worldwide; and 4) updated the inclusion
and exclusion criteria (see below).
We conducted electronic searches in two databases:
PubMed and Econlit. Search limits included studies
written in English and French, published between
January 2012 and June 2014. These dates allowed us to
have an overlap with the time frame covered by previ-
ous systematic reviews to avoid missing any pertinent
articles [5]. The complete search history is available in
Appendix 1.
In addition to the two databases listed above, we
used Google and Google Scholar to identify other
potentially relevant documents such as books, un-
published studies, study protocols, conference arti-
cles, and new PBF initiatives. We consulted the
websites of governmental and scientific institutes
concerned with PBF (e.g., the World Bank's website
on results-based financing, www.rbfhealth.org; the
Global Fund, http://www.theglobalfund.org). We also
contacted health economics experts to requestinformation on additional ongoing or recently com-
pleted studies. We provided them with a list of the
articles selected for this review and invited them to
identify any missing article.
Study selection
One investigator judged titles and abstracts of poten-
tially relevant studies according to inclusion and ex-
clusion criteria (Table 1). When the investigator
could not reach a final decision based on the ab-
stract solely, she proceeded to review the full text. If
a decision was still unattainable, a second investiga-
tor reviewed the article before reaching a consensual
decision. Two investigators read and appraised the
articles selected.
Data items and extraction
Two members of the research team performed data
extraction. The data extraction forms were custom-
designed. The following information was extracted to
summarize the articles: first author, publication year,
country where study was conducted, characteristics
of the PBF program, study objective (implicit or ex-
plicit), sample size, data gathering techniques, pri-
mary data analysis approach and main results of the
study in relation to our focus.
Summary measures and data synthesis
The studies selected used a variety of principal sum-
mary measures (e.g., technical efficiency scores,
Malmquist Productivity Index, difference in costs).
Where possible, we present the effects of the inter-
ventions as the difference between the intervention
and control groups at baseline and follow up percent-
ages or scores. We could not perform a meta-analysis
due to heterogeneity of studies and presentation of
results.
Appraising methodological and reporting quality of
included studies
We appraised the results of the studies by examining
the relation established between the costs and conse-
quences; the alternative interventions that were con-
sidered; the costs and consequences that were
included or omitted; the study limitations; and poten-
tial conflicts of interests.
To help us synthesize our assessment of the overall
strength of the evidence, we developed a concise list of
questions, adapted from Drummond et al. [10].
1. Was a clear relation between costs and
consequences demonstrated empirically?
2. Which types of designs were used to assess the
effectiveness of PBF?
Table 1 Inclusion and exclusion criteria
Inclusion criteria Exclusion criteria
Language English, French Other languages
Publication type All documents presenting empirical data (e.g., peer-reviewed articles) Protocols, editorials, guidelines and interviews
Study type Experimental or observational studies including a quantitative
assessment of 1) costs and effects, or 2) costs alone
Qualitative studies or studies that only examine
effects
Economic evaluation type Comparative evaluations: full economic evaluations and partial
economic evaluations
Non-comparative evaluations
Targeted entity Healthcare providers Solely patients
Country LMICs HICs
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alternatives?
4. Were the costs (or inputs) and consequences
measured longitudinally to examine change over
time?
5. Were all important costs (or inputs) and
consequences considered?
6. Were the studies conducted in different countries
and contexts?
7. Did the authors report potential conflicts of interest?Results
Study selection
In total, we identified 2, 639 potentially relevant articles
throughout PubMed, Econlit, Google Scholar and Goo-
gle. After eliminating duplicates and reviewing the
remaining abstracts, 45 studies were retained for a more
detailed analysis. Screening reference lists from earlier
reviews and expert consultations yielded 8 additional ar-
ticles. Thus, 53 full texts were assessed. Of these, seven
studies met our inclusion criteria (Fig. 1) and were in-
cluded in the review.
Appendix 3 presents a list of articles that were
screened, but then excluded. The most common rea-
son for exclusion was that the articles did not focus
on LMICs.Study characteristics and appraisal
We present a summary of each study’s characteristics in
Table 2. The table highlights the diversity of intervention
designs, study methods and outcomes. We also provide
a summary of our appraisal for each study in Table 3.Synthesis of results and appraisal
The section below presents our overall assessment of
the strength of the evidence, using the list of questions
we adapted from Drummond et al. [10].1. Was a clear relation between costs and consequences
demonstrated empirically?
None of the included studies were classified as full
economic evaluations that make clear connexions be-
tween the PBF costs and healthcare services and/or
health (Type I). In other words, none of the studies
included cost-effectiveness analyses, cost-utility ana-
lyses or cost-benefit analyses. For this reason, we clas-
sified the 7 studies as partial economic evaluations
(Type II), as they described the costs and conse-
quences of PBF initiatives without making a clear
connection between the two. It is important to note
that full economic evaluations are necessary to evalu-
ate whether PBF provides good value for money in
LMICs because they are more methodologically sound
than partial economic evaluations [10].2. Which types of designs were used to assess the
effectiveness of PBF?
An intervention that is not effective cannot provide
good value for money. Therefore, we examined the
designs that were used to assess the effectiveness of
PBF in the included studies. Of the seven articles,
only one study reported using a randomized control
trial to assess the consequences of PBF [16]. However,
Witter and colleagues [14] have identified problems
with the allocation to the treatment and control-
groups for this study. It appears that some districts
were found to have existing pay for performance
schemes, requiring the allocation to be adjusted in a
non-random way. This study found that the interven-
tion group had an increase in institutional deliveries
and preventive care visits, compared to the control
group. However, there was no improvement in the
number of women receiving any prenatal care; the
number of women completing four or more prenatal
visits; and the number of children receiving full im-
munisation schedules.1 The other articles included in
this review adopted a variety of observational designs,
Fig. 1 Search flow and results
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mates, time series and trend analyses. The majority of
studies did not use pre-intervention data in their ana-
lyses. Potential biases and mitigated results limit our
confidence in the effectiveness of PBF programs, as
presented in the studies.3. Were different types of interventions considered as
alternatives?
Economic evaluations require the comparison of two
alternatives to identify which is more efficient [2].
Most studies in this review compared the implemen-
tation of PBF to the status quo. System-strengthening
alternatives to improve the motivation of healthcare
workers or service delivery were not used as compar-
ators. Potential alternatives that could have been con-
sidered to test whether PBF provides the best value
for money include: other funding mechanisms; moni-
toring (without financial incentives); providing per-
formance feedback; training health workers; increasing
leadership skills; encouraging collaboration; and fos-
tering a culture that promotes trust and the intrinsic
value of work [17]. In addition, more studies should
attempt to tease apart the incentive effect from the
resource effect. Only one study included in this sys-
tematic review increased the budgets of the PBFintervention and control groups by the same amount
[16].4. Were the costs (or inputs) and consequences measured
longitudinally to examine change over time?
The seven articles examined the impact of PBF programs
over different time periods. Gok & Altmdag [18]’s study
ranges from 2001–2008; Bowser et al. [19] and Sabri
et al. [20]’s study cover a four-year time period; and
Zeng et al. [21], Basinga et al. [16], Rusa et al. [22], and
Soeters et al. [23] report change over a two year period.
From the studies in this review, little is known about
how the relation between PBF costs and outcomes in
LMICs evolves over the long term.5. Were all important costs (or inputs) and consequences
considered?
The studies did not provide a detailed description of the
costs that were included or omitted. The studies mostly
examined the immediate/direct financial costs and ef-
fects of the interventions. Authors generally did not at-
tempt or were not able to quantify all the different types
of costs and inputs (e.g., time and funds invested to
monitor the delivery of health services, time spent filling
out forms). Only aggregated costs were presented.








National Health Insurance (NHI) using
performance contracts. Implemented
in 2001. Expanded in 2006.
To assess trends in financial
sustainability, efficiency
payments, bonuses and
health system and health
outcomes.








Per capita spending on health services
provided by the NHI program
decreased from approximately BZ$177
(i.e., US$ 89) to BZ$ 136 (i.e., US$ 68)
between 2006 and 2009.
Non-contracted facility areas:
providers in three districts







NIH-contracted facility areas had
greater improvements in facility births,
nurse density, reducing maternal
mortality, diabetes deaths, and
morbidity compared to non-
contracted areas. However, NIH-
contracted facility areas had worst out-
comes for physician density and death






implemented in public and private
hospitals implemented since 2004.
To analyze the effects of the
P4P system on the hospitals’
efficiencies.
251 hospitals of which 25











In public hospitals, the average
efficiencies increased from 0.68 in
2005 to 0.73 in 2008, after the P4P
system was adopted. In private
hospitals, the average efficiencies






In public hospitals, the efficiency trend
increased from 0.981 in the pre-P4P
period to 1.018 after the implementation
of the PFP system. In private hospitals,
the efficiency trend decreased from
1.016 in the pre-PFP period to 0.967





PBF program initiated in 1999 and
scaled-up in 2005. Funded by USAID.
To evaluate the costs of
implementation as well as
the impact of PBF and/or
international support (training
& monitoring) on primary
healthcare services.
15 health centers with PBF
and 202 without PBF.












Incentive payments added 6 % to
base costs of PBF while international
support added 39 %. Incentives alone
were associated with a 39 % increase
in health services. Support alone was
associated with a 35 % increase in
health services. Support combined
with incentives was associated with an
87 % increase compared with health
facilities that did not receive either.
Non-incentivized services did not





P4P scheme providing incentives to
providers for improvements in
utilisation and quality of care.
Assess the effect of P4P on
the use and quality of child
and maternal care services.
80 health facilities were
assigned to a P4P program





The administrative costs associated
with P4P were estimated to be US$














Table 2 Characteristics of included studies (Continued)
National program gradually
implemented since 2005, after pilot
schemes by NGOs.
assigned to be control
facilities. 2 158 households
were also included.
surveyed at baseline
and after 23 months.
annual reports at
the national level.
0.8 % of total health expenditures per






The intervention group had a 23 %
increase in institutional deliveries, a
56 % increase in preventive care visits
by children aged 23 months or
younger, and a 132 % increase in
preventative care visits by children
between 24 and 59 months,
compared to the control group.
However, there were no improvement
in the number of women receiving
any prenatal care, the number of
women completing four or more
prenatal visits, and the number of





PBF (reimbursement mechanism with
‘indicator purchasing’ linked to
formative supervision). Implemented
in 2005. Expanded in 2006. Funded
by the Belgian Cooperation.
To evaluate the effect of PBF
on the performance of
healthcare centers.
74 health centers that
implemented PBF in 2005
and 85 health centers that
implemented PBF in 2006.
Data on services were
collected on a








The part of the subsidies spent on the
functioning of the health facility, grew
from approximately 8 % in 2005, to
23 % in 2006 and to 38 % in 2007.
Overall, the budget allocated to the
implementation of a PBF program
amounted to US$ 0.25/cap/year, of
which US$ 0.20/cap/year for subsidies
and an estimated US$ 0.05/cap/year
for administration, supervision and
training. Results showed a positive
effect for activities that were less
organized (i.e., monitoring services
and institutional deliveries). No effects
were found on curative consultations,
family planning, antenatal
consultations and vaccinations.





3 NGO contracting programs with
capitation payments to providers for
each individual enrolled.
Implemented since 2001. Funded by
World Bank, USAID or European
Commission.
To analyze the financing and
costs of contracting
healthcare services.





The reference cost used to negotiate
the delivery of a basic package of
health services with contracted NGOs
was estimated to be US$ 4.5 for 2002.
The cost varied among the different
donors. The annual per-capita cost
was US$ 3.8 for the World Bank, US$
4.2 for USAID and US$ 5.1 for the Euro-
pean Commission. The population
coverage for basic health services in-
creased from 9 % in 2002 to 82 % in
2006. However, the quality of services














Table 2 Characteristics of included studies (Continued)
long waiting times, absence of labora-
tory services, shortage of drugs, and
disrespect for patients). Facilities run
under the ministry's strengthening
mechanism and NGO contracts under
the World Bank and the USAID per-
formed better than contracts held by
the European Commission due to
cumbersome administrative proce-
dures. Authors discuss the preliminary
results of an Afghanistan household sur-
vey suggesting that under five child and




P4P program introduced in 2002 by
Cordaid.
To present Rwanda’s P4P
experience.










decreased by 62 %, from US$ 9.05 to
US$ 3.45. The percentage of
respondents who experienced a
catastrophic user fee payments
decreased from 2.5 % in 2003 to 0.7 %
in 2005. The proportion of women
delivering in a health facility increased
from 25 % to 60 %. In the discussion,
authors indicate that the
administrative costs of the fundholder
were about 25 % of the total































Were important costs (or inputs)
and consequences omitted?





No Status quo (traditional salaries and
line-item budgets).
2006 to 2010 No clear description of the
included and omitted costs.
1) absence of pre-intervention data; 2) possibil-
ity that other factors influenced the costs per
capita; 3) difficulty of teasing apart the effects
due to the incentives from those related to
other components of the reform.
- None declared








No Status quo (before vs after P4P). 2001-2008 Yes, for example, the costs of
implementing the program were
not included.
1) the absence of randomization; 2) the lack of
a control group; and 3) the use of





No International support (including
procurement procedures, minor
renovations, advice on community
mobilization, communication, public
relations & promotion of family planning).
2008-2010 No clear description of the
included and omitted costs for
the "international support".
1) absence of randomization; 2) the absence
of pre-intervention data; 3) the lack of
control for the quality of the data in the









No Input-based budgets in the control group
were increased by the average P4P
payments made to the intervention group
June, 2006 to Avril
2008 (~23 months)
Lack of detailed information on
the costs of PBF. Health
outcomes were not included.
1) the absence of pre-intervention data; 2)
problems identified with allocation to treat-












No Status quo for performance data
(3 months of pre-intervention data). No
alternative intervention was used to
compare costs.






administration costs. No detailed
description of the included and
omitted costs. Health outcomes
were not included.
1) insufficient use of pre-intervention data; 2)
the lack of a control group without PBF
during the entire time period; and 3) the
possibility that other interventions (e.g.,
mutual health organizations, sensitization
campaigns) influenced the results.
- None declared








No Comparison of three different PBF
programs.
2002 to 2006 No clear description of the
included and omitted costs.
Limited data on healthcare
services and health outcomes.
1) the lack of information on the
methodology used; and 2) the absence of
links between the costs and outcomes.
- None declared








No Comparison of PBF in early vs later stages. 2003 to 2005 Lack information on how PBF
affects total health expenditures
(only focuses on out-of-pocket
health spending).
1) absence of pre-intervention data; 2) absence
of a control group; and 3) possibility that
other interventions occurring simultaneously
reduced catastrophic user fee payments.
- None declared
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unintended consequences (e.g., reduction of healthcare
services not rewarded financially) were not sufficiently
considered.
6. Were the studies conducted in different countries and
contexts?
The seven articles were conducted in only five LMICs.
Table 4 presents the number of articles, the region and
the income level for each of these countries. Many re-
gions and countries currently implementing PBF are not
represented in these studies [24]. Moreover, some coun-
tries like Rwanda are characterised by unique political
contexts and demographic situations, limiting the
generalizability of results to other countries.
7. Did the authors report potential conflicts of interest?
Six out of seven articles had at least one author that was
or had been affiliated with an organisation involved in
the implementation of PBF, thereby resulting in a poten-
tial conflict of interest. The interpretation of data or
presentation of information may have been influenced
by their personal or financial relationship with other
people or organizations. Interestingly, only one author
explicitly reported having been employed by an
organization involved in the implementation of PBF as a
potential conflict of interest [21].
Summary of the assessment
Only seven articles fit out inclusion criteria. Overall,
the evidence of economic evaluations of PBF is weak
for the following reasons: (1) none of the studies were
full economic evaluations; (2) only one study used a
randomized controlled trial, but issues with the
randomization procedure were reported; (3) important
alternative interventions to strengthen the capacities
of the healthcare system have not been used as a





Rwanda 3 Sub-Saharan Africa Low-income economy








Afghanistan 1 South Asia Upper middle-income
economy




aThis classification is based on World Bank criteriaconsequences of PBF over the long term; (5) import-
ant costs and consequences were omitted from the
evaluations; (6) very few LMICs are represented in
the literature, despite wide implementation in these
countries; and (7) most articles had at least one au-
thor that was affiliated with an organisation involved
in the implementation of PBF, thereby resulting in a
potential conflict of interest.
Discussion
This systematic review highlights a lack of strong em-
pirical evidence that supports the idea that PBF in-
creases value for money in LMICs. This result is
consistent with past findings [4, 5, 11, 14]. For ex-
ample, a Cochrane review addressing the effectiveness
of PBF in LMICs found that the current evidence
base is too weak to draw general conclusions about
the effectiveness of PBF in LMICs. Without reliable
effectiveness-estimates, cost-effectiveness estimates
cannot be calculated. Thus, it would have been sur-
prising if this review had concluded differently.
The added value of this review is threefold. First,
replications of past reviews are useful to validate re-
sults and find articles that might have been over-
looked. Second, past reviews only included studies
published up to 2011–2012. An update was therefore
warranted, especially considering the rapid implemen-
tation of PBF in LMICs and the large number of
studies that have published on PBF since then. Third,
this is the first literature review with a search strategy
that specifically targeted articles on the efficiency of
PBF in LMICs. Thus, the current review has a differ-
ent focus than past reviews, providing a collection of
economic evaluations of PBF in LMICs that were not
previously identified. For example, six of the seven
studies in this systematic review were not included in
the Cochrane review. Three of the studies were pub-
lished after the Cochrane authors conducted their
search [18, 19, 21]. The three other studies included
in this systematic review, but not in the Cochrane re-
view, were published and available in time to be con-
sidered [20, 22, 23]. However, they were not included
and are not mentioned under “excluded studies” in the
Cochrane review. Consequently, our systematic review
may be useful to inform researchers and decision-
makers specifically concerned with optimizing value
for money in LMICs.
The reasons why so few PBF economic evaluations
have been conducted in LMICs, despite wide imple-
mentation, is worth exploring. First, PBF is a com-
plex intervention that targets multiple services. It is
therefore difficult to evaluate the impact of PBF on
health. Economic evaluations on this topic require
complex modelling because diverse people and many
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obtain good quality cost data in LMICs because the
information is not easily accessible. Last, inter-
national partners occasionally resist sharing their
costs, usually substantial at start up. Promoting
transparency may be useful to facilitate economic
evaluations on PBF.Strengths and limitations
While systematic reviews can take years to complete,
this review was conducted within a few months to re-
spond to timely concerns about whether PBF provides
the best value for money in LMICs. The time frame
usually required for producing systematic reviews has
been found to be inappropriate for local policy
makers that have urgent decisions to make [25]. This
issue was highlighted by a decision-maker in Haiti,
who widely shared an e-poster on the current results,
claiming that “long publication delays would eliminate
the important benefits of this review” (personal com-
munication, June 13, 2015). Despite its rapidity, this
review adheres to the core principles of systematic re-
views in order to avoid bias and ensure rigor. A de-
tailed description of the methods used was provided
to promote methodological transparency, and to fa-
cilitate replication.
Our review has limitations. First, the studies varied
in methodological quality and study characteristics.
These differences made it difficult to adequately com-
pare the results of the articles included in our sys-
tematic review. Second, as in the case with most
reviews, our review might have suffered from publica-
tion bias. Sponsors of inefficient PBF programs may
have blocked publishing to protect their interests [4].
Last, as with any review, we may have missed some
relevant information during the selection and data ex-
traction process.Future directions
Future researchers and evaluators should attempt to
make a direct relation between costs and conse-
quences of PBF in order to draw conclusions about
whether this financing option represents good value
for money. There is a need to adopt stronger designs
and to consider the long-term implications of these
programs on costs and health outcomes. In addition,
future studies should compare PBF to promising al-
ternative interventions that aim to strengthen the
healthcare system. It would also be beneficial to
analyze the literature around PBF in LMICs using
Drummond and Jefferson (1996)’s 38 defined quality
criteria, as seen in Emmert et al. [4]'s systematicreview, in order to generate an average quality score
for each article.
During our search, it has come to our attention
that at least three economic evaluations of PBF are
currently being conducted in LMICs. Borghi et al.
[26] published a protocol on the evaluation of a P4P
program in Tanzania. Using a controlled before and
after study, the authors aim to measure the cost-
effectiveness of the P4P program. Moreover, two eco-
nomic evaluations are being conducted on PBF initia-
tives in Malawi [27]. Together, these studies should
contribute to the evidence on the efficiency of PBF in
LMICs.
Conclusion
In contexts of limited resources such as LMICs, it is
essential that funders and decision-makers aim to
optimize the value obtained from the money invested
in healthcare services, in order to address the press-
ing health needs of the population. Some stakeholders
have proposed PBF as a promising avenue. However,
this review has demonstrated that there is a lack of
empirical evidence to support the claim that PBF rep-
resents good value for money. We still do not know
if, given the same amount of resources, PBF buys
more healthcare services or health than the status
quo or other interventions. Full economic evaluations
of PBF are needed to truly inform decision-makers in
LMICs on how to make better use of limited re-
sources to improve population health.
Endnotes
1It should be noted that a recent study published using
the same data found that there were no measurable dif-
ference in estimated probability of reporting illness with
diarrhea, fever or acute respiratory infections between
the intervention and comparison groups [28].
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Appendix 2.1: Bowser et al., 2013
Over the last 10 years, Belize has implemented a
National Health Insurance (NHI) program that uses
performance-based contracts with both public and
private facilities to improve financial sustainability,
efficiency and service provision. Data were collected
at the facility, district and national levels in order to
assess trends in financial sustainability, efficiency
payments, yearend bonuses and health system and
health outcomes. A difference-indifference approach
was used to assess the difference in technical effi-
ciency between private and public facilities. The re-
sults show that per capita spending on services
provided by the NHI program has decreased over
the period 2006–2009 from BZ$177 to BZ$136. The
private sector had achieved higher levels of technical
efficiency, but lower percentages of efficiency and
year-end bonus payments. Districts with contracts
Turcotte-Tremblay et al. Health Economics Review  (2016) 6:30 Page 13 of 18through the NHI program showed greater improve-
ments in facility births, nurse density, reducing ma-
ternal mortality, diabetes deaths and morbidity from
bronchitis, emphysema and asthma than districts
without contracts over the period 2006–2010. This
preliminary assessment of Belize’s pay-for-performance
system provides some positive results, however further re-
search is needed to use the lessons learned from Belize to
implement similar reforms in other systems.
Appendix 2.2: Gok and Altmdag (2015)
This paper analyzes the effects of the pay for per-
formance (PFP) system on the efficiencies of public
and private hospitals in Turkey. In order to evaluate
these effects, we examine the relationship between
hospital efficiency and health care costs in Turkey,
and addressed the impact of the PFP system on the
efficiencies of public and private hospitals. In an ef-
fort to analyze the efficiencies of public and private
hospitals, this study used data envelopment analysis.
The Malmquist Productivity Index is also used to
analyze the patterns of efficiency change for the study
years from 2001 to 2008. This study shows that
health care costs and hospital efficiency are negatively
correlated for private hospitals, while they are posi-
tively correlated for public hospitals. In other words,
increased health care costs might reduce efficiency in
private hospitals in contrast to public hospitals. Our
findings also indicate that average efficiencies of pub-
lic hospitals tend to increase, particularly during the
implementation period ofPFP system. The efficiency
trend of private hospitals, conversely, decreased in the
latter periods of the PFP system. Suggestions for im-
provement are provided to the health care policy
makers regarding the impact of health care reforms
on public and private hospitals.
Appendix 2.3: Zeng et al., 2013
To strengthen Haiti’s primary health care (PHC) sys-
tem, the country first piloted performance-based fi-
nancing (PBF) in 1999 and subsequently expanded
the approach to most internationally funded non-
government organizations. PBF complements support
(training and technical assistance). This study evalu-
ates (a) the separate impact of PBF and international
support on PHC’s service delivery; (b) the combined
impact of PBF and technical assistance on PHC’s ser-
vice delivery; and (c) the costs of PBF implementa-
tion in Haiti. To minimize the risk of facilities
neglecting potential non-incentivized services, the in-
centivized indicators were randomly chosen at the
end of each year. We obtained quantities of key ser-
vices from four departments for 217 health centres
(15 with PBF and 202 without) from 2008 through2010, computed quarterly growth rates and analysed
the results using a difference-in-differences approach
by comparing the growth of incentivized and non-
incentivized services between PBF and non-PBF facil-
ities. To interpret the statistical analyses, we also
interviewed staff in four facilities. Whereas inter-
national support added 39 % to base costs of PHC,
incentive payments added only 6 %. Support alone
increased the quantities of PHC services over 3 years
by 35 % (2.7 %/quarter). However, support plus in-
centives increased these amounts by 87 % over
3 years (5.7 %/quarter) compared with facilities with
neither input. Incentives alone was associated with a
net 39 % increase over this period, and more than
doubled the growth of services (P < 0.05). Interview
findings found no adverse impacts and, in fact, indi-
cated beneficial impacts on quality. Incentives proved
to be a relatively inexpensive, well accepted and very
effective complement to support, suggesting that a
small amount of money, strategically used, can sub-
stantially improve PHC. Haiti’s experience, after
more than a decade of use, indicates that incentives
are an effective tool to strengthen PHC.Appendix 2.4: Basinga et al., 2011
Background: Evidence about the best methods with
which to accelerate programs towards achieving the
Millennium Development Goals is urgently needed.
We assessed the effect of performance-based payment
of health-care providers (payment for performance;
P4P) on use and quality of child and maternal care
services in health-care facilities in Rwanda.
Methods: 166 facilities were randomly assigned at
the district level either to begin P4P funding be-
tween June, 2006, and October, 2006 (intervention
group; n = 80), or to continue with the traditional
input-based funding until 23 months after study
baseline (control group; n = 86). Randomisation was
done by coin toss. We surveyed facilities and 2158
households at baseline and after 23 months. The
main outcome measures were prenatal care visits
and institutional deliveries, quality of prenatal care,
and child preventive care visits and immunisation.
We isolated the incentive effect from the resource
eff ect by increasing comparison facilities’ input-
based budgets by the average P4P payments made to
the treatment facilities. We estimated a multivariate
regression specification of the difference-in-difference
model in which an individual’s outcome is regressed
against a dummy variable, indicating whether the
facility received P4P that year, a facility-fixed effect, a
year indicator, and a series of individual and house-
hold characteristics.
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intervention group had a 23 % increase in the num-
ber of institutional deliveries and increases in the
number of preventive care visits by children aged
23 months or younger (56 %) and aged between
24 months and 59 months (132 %). No improvements
were seen in the number of women completing four
prenatal care visits or of children receiving full im-
munisation schedules. The authors also estimated an
increase of 0 · 157 standard deviations (95 % CI 0 ·
026–0 · 289) in prenatal quality as measured by com-
pliance with Rwandan prenatal care clinical practice
guidelines.
Interpretation: The P4P scheme in Rwanda had the
greatest effect on those services that had the highest pay-
ment rates and needed the least effort from the service pro-
vider. P4P financial performance incentives can improve
both the use and quality of maternal and child health ser-
vices, and could be a useful intervention to accelerate pro-
gress towards Millennium Development Goals for maternal
and child health.
Appendix 2.5: Rusa et al., 2009
In 2005, the Ministry of Health in Rwanda, with the
support of the Belgian Technical Cooperation,
launched a strategy of performance-based financing
(PBF) in a group of 74 health centres (HCs), covering
2-m inhabitants. In 2006, PBF was extended to an
additional group of 85 HCs, thus reaching 3.8-m in-
habitants. This study evaluates the effect of PBF on
HC performance from 2005 to 2007. Composite indi-
cators for measuring quantity and quality of services
were developed and evaluated through monthly for-
mative supervisions by qualified and well-trained dis-
trict supervisors. The strategy was based on a fixed
fee per quality-approved service. The entire budget
spent on the implementation of PBF amounted to
$0.25 ⁄ cap ⁄ year, of which $0.20 ⁄ cap ⁄ year for sub-
sidies and an estimated $0.05 ⁄ cap ⁄ year for adminis-
tration, supervision and training. A positive effect on
utilization rates was only seen for activities that were
previously less well organized; in this case, growth
monitoring services and institutional deliveries. The
quality of services, defined as the compliance rate
with national and international norms, rose consider-
ably for all services in both groups. A sustained level
of quality between 80 % and 95 % was reached within
18 months in the first group. A similar result was
reached in the second group in 8 months.
Appendix 2.6: Sabri et al., 2007
Disruption caused by decades of war and civil strife
in Afghanistan has led many international and na-
tional nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) toassume responsibility for the delivery of health ser-
vices through contracts with donor agencies. Re-
cently the Afghan Government has pursued the
policy of contracting for a basic package of health
services (BPHS) supported by funds from three
major donors – the World Bank, the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) and
the European Commission. With the gradual
strengthening of the public health ministry, options
for the future include pursuing the contracting op-
tion or increasing public provision of health services.
Should contracting with NGOs be pursued, a clear
strategy is required that includes developing ac-
creditation instruments, better contracting mecha-
nisms and a system for monitoring and evaluating
the entire process. Should the government opt for
an increasing role, problems to be solved include se-
curing the transition to public provision, obtaining
guarantees that appropriate financing will be pro-
vided and reconfiguration of the public health deliv-
ery system. Large-scale contracting with the private
for-profit sector cannot be recommended at this
stage, although this option could be explored via
subcontracting by larger NGOs or smallscale trial
contracts initiated by the public health ministry. Ir-
respective of the option chosen, an important chal-
lenge remaining is the recalcitrant problem of high
out-of-pocket payments.
Sustainable delivery of health services in Afghanistan
can only be achieved with a clear national strategy in
which all stakeholders have roles to play in the finan-
cing, regulation and delivery of services.
Appendix 2.7: Soeters et al., 2006
Evidence from low-income Asian countries shows that
performance-based financing (as a specific form of con-
tracting) can improve health service delivery more success-
fully than traditional input financing mechanisms. We
report a field experience from Rwanda demonstrating that
performance-based financing is a feasible strategy in sub-
Saharan Africa too. Performance-based financing requires
at least one new actor, an independent well equipped fund-
holder organization in the district health system separating
the purchasing, service delivery as well as regulatory roles
of local health authorities from the technical role of con-
tract negotiation and fund disbursement. In Rwanda, local
community groups, through patient surveys, verified the
performance of health facilities and monitored consumer
satisfaction. A precondition for the success of performance
based financing is that authorities must respect the autono-
mous management of health facilities competing for public
subsidies. These changes are an opportunity to redistribute
roles within the health district in a more transparent and
efficient fashion.
Turcotte-Tremblay et al. Health Economics Review  (2016) 6:30 Page 15 of 18Appendix 3Table 5 Characteristics of excluded studies
# Authors (year) Reason for exclusiona
1 Agee & Gates (2012) Not focused on LMIC
2 Allen, Nobel & Burton (2012) Not focused on LMIC
3 Awoonor-Williams (2013) Main focus not on PBF intervention
4 Baral (2012) Not an economic evaluation
5 Bernstein (2014) Not an empirical study
6 Blecker (2014) Not focused on LMIC
7 Blumenthal, Song, Jena & Ferris (2013) Not focused on LMIC
8 Broughton et al. (2013) Main focus not on PBF intervention
9 Chee (2003) Main focus not on PBF intervention
10 Cheng, Lee & Chen (2012) Not focused on LMIC
11 Eichler et al. (2013) Not an empirical study
12 Falisse, Meessen, Ndayishimiye & Brossuyt (2012) Not an economic evaluation
13 Gerber-Grote & Windeler (2014) Main focus not on PBF intervention
14 Ginsburg (2013) Not focused on LMIC
15 Greene, Hibbard & Overton (2014) Not focused on LMIC
16 Higgs,Stammer, Roth & Balster (2013) Not an empirical study
17 Himmelstein, Ariely & Woolhandler (2014) Not focused on LMIC
18 Holcombe (2014) Not focused on LMIC
19 Hupp (2014) Not focused on LMIC
20 Ireland, Paul & Dujardin (2011) Not an empirical study
21 Jeong (2012) Not an economic evaluation
22 Johnson & Higgins (2014) Not an empirical study
23 Karash (2013) Not an empirical study
24 Lee, Cheng, Chen & Lai (2010) Not focused on LMIC
25 Lorincz, Lawson & Long (2013) Not focused on LMIC
26 Maynard (2011) Not focused on LMIC
27 McMahon & Chopra (2012) Not focused on LMIC
28 Moore & DeBuono (2013) Not focused on LMIC
29 Peabody et al. (2010) Main focus not on PBF intervention
30 Rajkumar, Conway & Tavenner (2014) Not focused on LMIC
31 Ran, Luo, Wu, Yao & Feng (2013) Not an economic evaluation
32 Robeznieks (2012) Not an economic evaluation
33 Rosenau, Lal & Lako (2012) Not focused on LMIC
34 Ryan (2013) Not focused on LMIC
35 Saronga et al. (2014) Main focus not on PBF intervention
36 Swensen, Dilling, Mc Carty, Bolton & Harper (2013) Not focused on LMIC
37 Tan, Pwu, Chen & Yang (2014) Not focused on LMIC
38 Tummers, Schrijvers & Visser-Meily (2013) Not focused on LMIC
39 VanLare, Blum & Conway (2012) Not focused on LMIC
40 Wilson (2013) Not focused on LMIC
Table 5 Characteristics of excluded studies (Continued)
41 Wranik (2012) Not focused on LMIC
42 Yip et al. (2014) Not an economic evaluation
43 Zeng, Rwiyereka, Amico, Avila-Figueroa & Shepard (2014) Not an economic evaluation
a Articles that were excluded often did not meet more than one inclusion criteria. However, only one reason for exclusion is mentioned in the table above
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